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STATE OF NEW YORK
SUPREME COURT COUNTY OF FRANKLIN
____________________________________________X
In the Matter of the Application of
MILTON JONES, #82-A-2073,
Petitioner,
       
for Judgment Pursuant to Article 78 DECISION AND JUDGMENT
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules RJI #16-1-2015-0086.21
INDEX # 2015-159
-against- ORI #NY016015J
NYS BOARD OF PAROLE,
Respondent.
____________________________________________X
This is a proceeding for judgment pursuant to Article 78 of the CPLR that was
originated by the Petition of Milton Jones, verified on January 7, 2015 and filed in the
Franklin County Clerk’s office on February 23, 2015.  Petitioner, who is an inmate at the
Bare Hill Correctional Facility, is challenging the July 2014 determination denying him
discretionary parole release and directing that he be held for an additional 24 months. 
The Court issued an Order to Show cause on March 2, 2015 and has received and reviewed
respondent’s Answer and Return, including in camera materials, verified on April 16,
2015 and supported by the Letter Memorandum of Christopher J. Fleury, Esq., Assistant
Attorney General, dated April 16, 2015 as well as by the Affirmation of Terrence X. Tracy,
Esq., Counsel, New York State of Board of Parole, dated April 10, 2015.  The Court has
also received and reviewed petitioner’s Opposition to the Respondent’s Answer and
Return dated May 4, 2015 and filed in the Franklin County Clerk’s office on May 8, 2015.
On April 23, 1982 petitioner was sentenced in Supreme Court, New York County,
as a second felony offender, to an indeterminate sentence of 25 years to life and a
consecutive indeterminate sentence of 10 to 20 years upon his convictions of the crimes
of Murder 2° and Attempted Murder 2°.   The criminal offenses underlying petitioner’s
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1982 convictions were committed less than six months after he had been released from
state custody to parole supervision in connection with a previous (1973) Manslaughter 1°
conviction.  
After having been denied discretionary parole release on three prior occasions
petitioner made his fourth appearance before a Parole Board on July 8, 2014.  Following
that appearance a decision was issued again denying him discretionary parole release and
directing that he be held for an additional 24 months.  The July 2014 parole denial
determination reads as follows:
“AFTER A REVIEW OF THE RECORD AND INTERVIEW, THE PANEL
HAS DETERMINED THAT IF RELEASED AT THIS TIME THERE IS A
REASONABLE PROBABILITY THAT YOU WOULD NOT LIVE AND
REMAIN AT LIBERTY WITHOUT AGAIN VIOLATING THE LAW AND
YOUR RELEASE WOULD BE INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE WELFARE OF
SOCIETY AND WOULD [SO] DEPRECATE THE SERIOUS NATURE OF
THE CRIME AS TO UNDERMINE RESPECT FOR THE LAW.  THIS
DECISION IS BASED ON THE FOLLOWING FACTORS: YOUR INSTANT
OFFENSE’S [sic] ARE: MURDER 2, ATT. MURDER 2 IN WHICH YOU
STABBED A HELPLESS UNARMED FEMALE STRANGER AND WHEN
ANOTHER PERSON AND HER HUSBAND RAN INTO YOU, YOU TRIED
TO HARM THEM AND YOU DID SO WHILE ON PAROLE FOR
MANSLAUGHTER IN WHICH YOU STABBED AND KILLED ANOTHER
VICTIM.
YOUR RECORD DATES BACK TO A 1965 PINS, INCLUDES: 2 FELONIES,
2 MISDEMEANORS, A JUVENILE HISTORY, PRIOR VIOLENCE, PRIOR
PRISON, AND JAIL, AND FAILURE AT/PRIOR COMMUNITY
SUPERVISION.
NOTE IS MADE OF YOUR SENTENCING MINUTES, COMPAS RISK
ASSESSMENT, REHABILITATIVE EFFORTS, RISKS, NEEDS, LETTERS
OF SUPPORT, CLEAN DISCIPLINARY RECORD, LACK OF REMORSE,
LACK OF INSIGHT, PAROLE PLAN AND ALL OTHER FACTORS
REQUIRED BY LAW.
YOU CLEARLY FAIL TO BENEFIT FROM PRIOR EFFORTS OF
LENIENCY AND REHABILITATION.  PAROLE IS DENIED.”
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The document perfecting petitioner’s administrative appeal from the July 2014 parole
denial determination was received by the DOCCS Board of Parole Appeals Unit on
August 20, 2014.  The Appeals Unit, however, failed to issue its findings and
recommendations within the four-month time frame set forth in 9 NYCRR §8006.4(c). 
This proceeding ensued.
Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A), as amended by L 2011, ch 62, part C , subpart A,
§38-f-1, effective March 31, 2011, provides, in relevant part, as follows: 
“Discretionary release on parole shall not be granted merely as a reward for
good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after
considering if there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is
released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and
that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not
so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the
law.  In making the parole release decision, the procedures adopted
pursuant to subdivision four of section two hundred fifty-nine-c of this
article shall require that the following be considered: (i) the institutional
record including program goals and accomplishments, academic
achievements, vocational education, training or work assignments, therapy
and interactions with staff and inmates . . . (iii) release plans including
community resources, employment, education and training and support
services available to the inmate . . . (vii) the seriousness of the offense with
due consideration to the type of sentence, length of sentence and
recommendations of the sentencing court, the district attorney, the attorney
for the inmate, the presentence probation report as well as consideration of
any mitigating and aggravating factors, and activities following arrest prior
to confinement; and (viii) prior criminal record, including the nature and
pattern of offenses, adjustment to any previous probation or parole
supervision and institutional confinement . . .”
Discretionary parole release determinations are statutorily deemed to be judicial
functions which are not reviewable if done in accordance with law (Executive Law §259-
i(5) unless there has been a showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety.  See Silmon
v. Travis, 95 NY2d 470, Hamilton v. New York State Division of Parole, 119 AD3d 1268,
Vasquez v. Dennison, 28 AD3d 908 and Webb v. Travis, 26 AD3d 614. Unless the
petitioner makes a “convincing demonstration to the contrary” the Court must presume
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that the New York State Board of Parole acted properly in accordance with statutory
requirements.  See Jackson v. Evans, 118 AD3d 701, Nankervis v. Dennison, 30 AD3d 521
and Zane v. New York State Division of Parole, 231 AD2d 848.
Executive Law §259-c(4)  was amended by L 2011, ch 62, part C, subpart A, §38-b,
effective October 1, 2011, to provide that the New York State Board of Parole shall
“. . . establish written procedures for its use in making parole decisions as required by law. 
Such written procedures shall incorporate risk and needs principles to measure the
rehabilitation of persons appearing before the board, the likelihood of success of such
persons upon release, and assist members of the state board of parole in determining
which inmates may be released to parole supervision . . .”   To the extent petitioner argues1
that the Parole Board failed to adopt, through formal rule making processes,
procedures implementing the above-referenced amendment to Executive Law §259-
c(4), the Court finds that the promulgation of the October 5, 2011 memorandum from
Andrea W. Evans, then Chairwoman, New York State Board of Parole, satisfied the Parole
Board’s obligations with respect to the 2011 amendment.  See Partee v. Evans, 117 AD3d
1258, lv denied 24 NY3d 901, and Montane v. Evans, 116 AD3d 197, lv granted 23 NY3d
903, app dis 24 NY3d 1052.
Petitioner also argues that the Parole Board focused exclusively on the serious
nature of the crimes underlying his incarceration, without adequate consideration of other
statutory factors.  A Parole Board, however, need not assign equal weight to each statutory
factor it is required to consider in connection with a discretionary parole determination,
 Prior to the amendment the statute had  provided, in relevant part, that the Board of Parole shall1
“. . . establish written guidelines for its use in making parole decisions as required by law . . . Such written
guidelines may consider the use of a risk and needs assessment instrument to assist members of the state
board of parole in determining which inmates may be released to parole supervision . . .” 
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nor is it required to expressly discuss each of those factors in its written decision.  See
Montane v. Evans, 116 AD3d 197, lv granted 23 NY3d 903, app dismissed 24 NY3d 1052,
Valentino v. Evans, 92 AD3d 1054 and Martin v. New York State Division of Parole, 47
AD3d 1152. As noted by the Appellate Division, Third Department, the role of a court
reviewing a parole denial determination “. . . is not to assess whether the Board gave the
proper weight to the relevant factors, but only whether the Board followed the statutory
guidelines and rendered a determination that is supported, and not contradicted, by the
facts in the record.  Nor could we effectively review the Board’s weighing process, given
that it is not required to state each factor that it considers, weigh each factor equally or
grant parole as a reward for exemplary institutional behavior.”  Comfort v. New York State
Division of Parole, 68 AD3d 1295, 1296 (citations omitted). 
In the case at bar, reviews of the Parole Board Report (Reappearance July 2014)
and transcript of petitioner’s July 8, 2014 Parole Board appearance reveal that the Board
had before it information with respect to the appropriate statutory factors, including
petitioner’s prior criminal record, programing record, COMPAS ReEntry Risk Assessment
Instrument, sentencing minutes, disciplinary record (clean since 2011 with last “serious
ticket” in 2005) and release plans/community support in addition to the circumstances of
the crimes underlying his incarceration, including the fact that they were committed while
petitioner was at liberty under parole supervision from a previous Manslaughter 1°
conviction.  The Court, moreover, finds nothing in the transcript to suggest that the Parole
Board cut short petitioner’s discussion of any relevant factor or otherwise prevented him
from expressing clear and complete responses to its inquiries. 
In view of the above, the Court finds no basis to conclude that the Parole Board
failed to consider the relevant statutory factors. See Pearl v. New York State Division of
Parole, 25 AD3d 1058 and Zhang v. Travis, 10 AD3d 828.  Since the requisite statutory
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factors were considered, and given the narrow scope of judicial review of discretionary
parole denial determinations, the Court finds no basis to conclude that the denial
determination in this case was affected by irrationality boarding on impropriety as a result
of the emphasis placed by the Board on the nature of the crimes underlying petitioner’s
most recent incarceration, including the fact that they were committed while petitioner
was at liberty under parole supervision from a previous Manslaughter 1° conviction, his
prior criminal record and lack of remorse/insight.  See Lackwood v. New York State
Division of Parole, 127 AD3d 1495,  Jones v. New York State Parole Board, 127 AD3d
1327, Thompson v. New York State Board of Parole, 120 AD3d 1518 and Vaughn v.
Evans, 98 AD3d 1158.   
To the extent petitioner purports to rely on King v. New York State Division of
Parole, 190 AD2d 423, aff’d 83 NY2d 788, the Court finds such reliance misplaced.  In
King the Appellate Division, First Department, not only determined that the Parole Board
improperly considered matters not within its purview (penal policy with respect to
convicted murders) but also that the Parole Board failed “ . . . to consider and fairly weigh
all of the information available to them concerning petitioner that was relevant under the
statute, which clearly demonstrates his extraordinary rehabilitative achievements and
would appear to strongly militate in favor of granting parole.” Id at 433.  The appellate-
level court in King went on to note that the only statutory criterion referenced by the Board
in the parole denial determination was the seriousness of the crime underlying Mr. King’s
incarceration (felony murder of an off-duty police officer during the robbery of a fast food
restaurant).  According to the Appellate Division, First Department, “[s]ince . . . the
Legislature has determined that a murder conviction per se should not preclude parole,
there must be a showing of some aggravating circumstances beyond the inherent
seriousness of the crime itself.” Id at 433.  
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This Court (Supreme Court, Franklin County) first notes that although the nature
of the crime underlying Mr. King’s incarceration was somewhat similar in nature to one
of the crimes underlying petitioner’s incarceration (Murder 2°), Mr. King had no prior
contacts with the law (id. at 426) while petitioner has a prior criminal record and
committed his instant offenses while at liberty under parole supervision from a prior
conviction of a violent felony offense (Manslaughter 1°). These distinguishing features
appear to meet the First Department’s requirement that a parole denial determination be
supported by aggravating circumstances beyond the inherent seriousness of the underlying
crime.  In any event, however, in July of 2014 the Appellate Division, Third Department -
whose precedent is binding on this Court - effectively determined that the above-
referenced “aggravating circumstances” requirement enunciated by the First Department
in King does not represent the state of the law in the Third Department.  See Hamilton v.
New York State Division of Parole, 119 AD3d 1268.  In Hamilton it was noted that the
Third Department  “ . . . has repeatedly held - both recently and historically  - that, so long
as the [Parole] Board considers the factors enumerated in the statute [Executive Law §259-
i(2)(c)(A)] it is ‘entitled . . . to place a greater emphasis on the gravity of [the] crime’
(Matter of Montane v. Evans, 116 AD3d 197, 203 (2014), lv granted 23 NY3d 903 (2014)
[internal quotation marks and citations omitted]’ . . .” Id at 1271 (other citations omitted). 
After favorably citing nine Third Department cases decided between 1977 and 2014, the 
 Hamilton court ended the string of cites as follows: “ . . . but see Matter of King v. New
York State Div. of Parole, 190 AD2d 423, 434 (1993), aff’d on other grounds 83 NY2d
788[ ] (1994) [a First Department case holding, in conflict with our precedent, that the2
 The Court of Appeals in King only referenced the fact that “ . . . one of the [Parole] Commissioners2
considered factors outside the scope of the applicable statute, including penal philosophy, the historical
treatment of individuals convicted of murder, the death penalty, life imprisonment without parole, and the
consequences to society if those sentences are not in place.  Consideration of such factors is not authorized
by Executive Law §259-i.”  83 NY2d 788, 791.  The Court of Appeals, however, did not address that aspect
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Board [of Parole] may not deny discretionary release based solely on the nature of the
crime when the remaining statutory factors are considered only to be dismissed as not
outweighing the seriousness of the crime].” 119 AD3d 1268, 1272.  The Hamilton court
continued as follows:
“Particularly relevant here, we have held that, even when a petitioner’s
institutional behavior and accomplishments are ‘exemplary,’ the Board may
place ‘particular emphasis’ on the violent nature or gravity of the crime in
denying parole, as long as the relevant statutory factors are considered
(Matter of Valderrama v. Travis, 19 AD3d at 905).  In so holding we
explained that, despite [the Valderrama] petitioner’s admirable educational
and vocational accomplishments and positive prison disciplinary history,
‘[o]ur settled jurisprudence is that a parole determination made in
accordance with the requirements of the statutory guidelines is not subject
to further judicial review unless it is affected by irrationality bordering on
impropriety’ (id. [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]).  We
emphasize that this Court [Appellate Division, Third Department] has
repeatedly reached the same result, on the same basis, when reviewing
denials of parole to petitioners whom we recognized as having exemplary
records and as being compelling candidates for release.” 119 AD3d 1268,
1272 (additional citations omitted).
The Court therefore rejects petitioner’s argument on this point.
Finally, petitioner notes that the COMPAS instrument scored him as a low risk for
committing new felony violence as well as for rearrest and/or for absconding.  This Court
finds, however, that  although the Appellate Division, Third Department, has determined
that a risk and needs assessment instrument (such as COMPAS) must be utilized in
connection with post-September 30, 2011 parole release determinations (see Linares v.
Evans, 112 AD3d 1056, Malerba v. Evans, 109 AD3d 1067, lv denied 22 NY3d 858 and
Garfield v. Evans, 108 AD3d 830), there is nothing in such cases, or the amended version
of Executive Law §259-c(4), to suggest that the quantified risk assessment determined
of the Appellate Division, First Department, decision in King holding that a parole denial determination
must be based upon a showing of some aggravating circumstances beyond the inherent seriousness of the
underlying crime.
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through utilization of the risk and needs assessment instrument supercedes the
independent discretionary authority of the Parole Board to determine, based upon its
consideration of the factors set forth in Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A), whether or not an
inmate should be released to parole supervision.  The “risk and need principles” that must
be incorporated pursuant to the amended version of Executive Law §259-c(4), while
intended to measure the rehabilitation of a prospective parolee as well as the likelihood
that he/she would succeed under community-based parole supervision, serve only to
“ . . . assist members of the state board of parole in determining which inmates may be
released to parole supervision . . .”   Executive Law §259-c(4)(emphasis added).  Thus,
while the Parole Board was required to consider the COMPAS instrument when exercising
its discretionary authority to determine whether or not petitioner should be released from
DOCCS custody to community-based parole supervision, it was not bound by the
quantified results of the COMPAS assessment and was free to grant or deny parole based
upon its independent assessment of the factors set forth in Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A)
including, as here, the nature of the crimes underlying his incarceration, together with the
fact that they were committed while at liberty under parole supervision from a prior
conviction of a violent felony offense (Manslaughter 1°).  See Rivera v. New York State
Division of Parole, 119 AD3d 1107 and Partee v. Evans, 40 Misc 3d 896, aff’d 117 AD3d
1258, lv denied 24 NY3d 901.  See also Lackwood v. New York State Division of Parole,
127 AD3d 1495.
Based upon all the above, it is, therefore, the decision of the Court and it is hereby
ADJUDGED, that the petition is dismissed.
Dated: September 11, 2015 at 
Indian Lake, New York.        __________________________
                                                                                        S. Peter Feldstein
   Acting Supreme Court Justice
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